Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. ." Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." . At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. That very night, the idea was put to the test. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). 2, pp. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. . Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. McNamara was ready to respond. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. It is not NSA's intention to prove or Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. 426-436. When Did the U.S. ", "No," replied McCone. Fluoride. In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. . In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. 3. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. A U.S. Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land) team officer assigned to the SOG maritime operations training staff, Lieutenant James Hawes, led the covert boat fleet out of Da Nang and down the coast 300 miles to Cam Ranh Bay, where they waited out the crisis in isolation. Vaccines. Hickman, Kennedy. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. Vietnam is a very watery country. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. Gulf Of Tonkin no isolated event. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. 2. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. 13. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. What really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964? . After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. The Dollar Bill . These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. 136-137. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. $22. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). 4. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. 313-314. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. The accords, which were signed by other participants including the Viet Minh, mandated a temporary ceasefire line, which separated southern and northern Vietnam to be governed by the State of Vietnam an On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. 8. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga.
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